Remuneration of the SARL manager : precautions to take

In this period of general assemblies which begins, company managers will be well advised to take some precautions regarding their remuneration. Advice from Julien Gasbaoui, lawyer devoting his activity to criminal business law.

Amount of remuneration, content of the remuneration and power of the majority shareholder : the rules are known, but in practice most often not applied. Or, before a judge, invoking usage is not an argument. Better, to prevent any litigation, respect the rules. First, vote on remuneration upstream and not after the fact. In principle, the remuneration of the SARL manager must be fixed in advance. First solution : this remuneration can be set in the statutes. What is not recommended, because any subsequent development would require a modification of the statutes. Hard to imagine. Second solution : a collective decision decides a fixed and sustainable amount, with possibly a calculation method concerning a variable part. In this case, la rémunération devra être versée tant qu’elle ne sera pas révoquée.
Mais bien souvent, il n’est pas possible de fixer la rémunération en amont, celle-ci étant corrélée fortement à l’activité de la société. L’évidence juridique se heurte aux réalités économiques… Consequently, l’habitude se prend de valider a posteriori la rémunération, lors de l’assemblée générale de l’année suivante. Currently, les SARL dont l’exercice social se termine au 31 décembre commencent à envoyer les convocations aux assemblées générales ordinaires, lors desquelles les gérants feront valider les prélèvements qu’ils ont effectués durant l’année précédente.

Si l’assemblée générale refuse l’approbation…
On pourrait s’interroger, et à l’extrême imaginer que les prélèvements pourraient encourir la qualification d’abus de biens sociaux, en ce sens que le gérant n’a pas été autorisé, comme le demande la loi, à prélever les fonds. Une telle interprétation serait exagérée, car c’est la réalité du travail qui compte. Dès lors que le gérant s’implique dans l’intérêt de la société et que sa rémunération n’est pas disproportionnée par rapport au travail fourni, il n’y a pas lieu de s’inquiéter. On the other hand, the problem will arise if the general assembly refuses the approval. The manager could then be forced to repay. In other words, the possible intervention of a general meeting a posteriori exposes the manager to a risk of reimbursement of his remuneration. To avoid this type of inconvenience, managers will be well inspired to offer, during the AGM of year N, a resolution and a vote setting their remuneration for the coming year N+1, why not by allowing yourself a formula like : “remuneration within the limit of…. ».

Include social contributions in remuneration
Majority managers and managers, associated or not, belonging to a majority management college, are obligatory covered by the social security of the self-employed. In principle, contributions are therefore due personally by the manager himself and not by the company. So, the practice, well anchored, wanting social contributions to be paid by the company is in reality abnormal. It is legally possible, but in this case social contributions must be included in the gross remuneration of the manager, Who, SO, mechanically, increase. And this amount must be voted on by the partners..
It is worth emphasizing : it is the associated manager who owes the sums to URSSAF and not the company which is in no way in debt.. The manager's contributions are personal. If the company pays, it will be necessary that the manager's current account (which must therefore be fed, remember that a current account cannot be debit) be debited for the amount of the sums due. These accounting records must be made even if calls for contributions are postponed during this pandemic period.. This accounting entry proving that it is indeed the manager who has paid his social security contributions could prove crucial in the event of litigation. !

The majority manager does pretty much what he wants
The question arises regularly : how can minority shareholders act so that the majority manager does not remunerate himself excessively, thus depriving them of dividends ? First of all, you should know that the determination of the remuneration of the manager of a limited liability company by the meeting of shareholders does not result from an agreement.. Remember that a regulated agreement must be approved by the general meeting of shareholders with the majority expected for ordinary decisions. ; mais l’associé ou le gérant concerné par la convention à approuver ne peut participer au vote. La rémunération du gérant ne faisant pas l’objet d’une convention réglementée, celui-ci peut donc prendre part au vote concernant sa propre rémunération.
Que peuvent faire les minoritaires ? Certainly, ils peuvent intenter un procès pour abus de majorité. Or, si la notion d’abus de majorité existe, elle est rarement efficace. Indeed, pour qu’un abus de majorité soit avéré, cela suppose la réunion de deux conditions cumulatives, à savoir la contrariété à l’intérêt social et la rupture d’égalité entre majoritaires et minoritaires. À cet égard, comme en témoigne un récent arrêt, contrariety to the social interest cannot be sufficient in the absence of a breach of equality*. But the opposite is also true : the breach of equality is insufficient in the absence of conflict with the social interest**. The conditions being, let's remember, cumulative, it will therefore be necessary, to hope to see the action of the minorities succeed, that these demonstrate that the majority receive excessive resources and that this is done not only to the detriment of the structure but also of the minorities.

A minority manager must know what can happen to him
When starting a business, it happens that a partner, who carries the idea, is a minority but is appointed as manager. This minority manager must be aware of the weaknesses of his position and the risks that his project will escape him.. Indeed, It appears from all of the above that a minority associate manager may not only be dismissed, but then find yourself in a situation where the new manager, majority or placed by the majority, will be able to, fact, deprive him of dividends without legal action being able to protect him. The judicial reaction will then not necessarily be favorable to him. He will simultaneously lose his power and his income. To put it in other words and more trivially : a majority partner makes (presque) what he wants !